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BACKGROUND: In 2016, 23% of children (155 million) aged <5 were stunted. Global-level modeling has consistently found climate change impacts
on food production are likely to impair progress on reducing undernutrition.
OBJECTIVES:We adopt a new perspective, assessing how climate change may aﬀect child stunting via its impacts on two interacting socioeconomic
drivers: incomes of the poorest 20% of populations (due to climate impacts on crop production, health, labor productivity, and disasters) and food
prices.
METHODS:We developed a statistical model to project moderate and severe stunting in children aged <5 at the national level in 2030 under low and
high climate change scenarios combined with poverty and prosperity scenarios in 44 countries.
RESULTS:We estimated that in the absence of climate change, 110 million children aged <5 would be stunted in 2030 under the poverty scenario in
comparison with 83 million under the prosperity scenario. Estimates of climate change–attributable stunting ranged from 570,000 under the prosper-
ity/low climate change scenario to >1million under the poverty/high climate change scenario. The projected impact of climate change on stunting
was greater in rural vs. urban areas under both socioeconomic scenarios. In countries with lower incomes and relatively high food prices, we projected
that rising prices would tend to increase stunting, whereas in countries with higher incomes and relatively low food prices, rising prices would tend to
decrease stunting. These ﬁndings suggest that food prices that provide decent incomes to farmers alongside high employment with living wages will
reduce undernutrition and vulnerability to climate change.
CONCLUSIONS: Shifting the focus from food production to interactions between incomes and food price provides new insights. Futures that protect
health should consider not just availability, accessibility, and quality of food, but also the incomes generated by those producing the food. https://doi.
org/10.1289/EHP2916
Introduction
Despite being a focus of health and global development policy for
decades, and notwithstanding signiﬁcant progress in many coun-
tries, child undernutrition remains a major contributor to the global
burden of disease (GBD). An estimated 23% (155 million) of chil-
dren aged <5 were stunted (low height-for-age) in 2016 (UNICEF
et al. 2017), which has major health implications. In comparison
with not being stunted, moderate stunting has an all-cause mortality
odds ratio (OR) of 1.6; for severe stunting, it increases to 4.1 (Black
et al. 2008). Morbidity risk increases for diseases, including pneu-
monia and diarrheal disease (Prendergast and Humphrey 2014). In
the longer term, a reduction in neurodevelopmental and cognitive
function may lead to reduced learning and earning capacity, and the
risk of chronic disease is increased (de Onis and Branca 2016;
Victora et al. 2008).
Global-level modeling studies have consistently found that cli-
mate change is likely to impair progress on reducing undernutrition
(e.g., Hasegawa et al. 2015; Ishida et al. 2014; Nelson et al. 2010).
For instance, Lloyd et al. (2011) found that that high climate
change may result in a relative increase in severe stunting of 23%
in Sub-Saharan Africa and 62% in South Asia in the 2050s. In such
global-level studies, the mechanism via which climate change
aﬀects undernutrition is through changed crop productivity, which
aﬀects post-trade national calorie availability. Projected calorie
availability is combined with ﬁxed (i.e., not aﬀected by climate
change) scenario-speciﬁc socioeconomic variables, such as popu-
lation size and per capitaGrossDomestic Product (GDPpc), to esti-
mate undernutrition. These ﬁxed socioeconomic variables have a
major inﬂuence: A consistent ﬁnding is that the diﬀerences in
undernutrition between plausible socioeconomic futures is consid-
erably larger than that between plausible climate change futures
(e.g., Lloyd et al. 2014; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007).
This ﬁnding raises three related issues. First, given the com-
plexity of the causation of undernutrition, the large inﬂuence of
socioeconomic conditions is expected. For example, Smith and
Haddad (2015) found that between 1970 and 2012, 67% of the
reduction in stunting was due to improvements in women’s educa-
tion, gender equality, and access to adequate water and sanitation
services. Rayner and Lang (2012) state that measures of height
(including stunting) are “less an indicator of nutritional status and
more a comment on the ‘nutrition-environment interaction,’”where
“environment” refers to context rather than just the natural environ-
ment. That is, at the population level, stunting is about more than
food. Second, as well as aﬀecting food production, climate change
may aﬀect undernutrition via socioeconomic routes. For instance,
recent work shows that climate change may aﬀect the income of the
poorest population groups disproportionately (Hallegatte et al.
2016), and this impact may in turn inﬂuence undernutrition risk.
Third, interactions between routes from climate to undernutrition
may mean the combined impacts are not simply additive and are
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thus not easily predictable. However, to our knowledge, no previous
global-level climate–undernutrition models have considered impacts
operating through routes other than food production or more than one
climate entry point at a time.
In this paper, we take a ﬁrst step toward examining how climate
change entering through two interacting socioeconomic drivers—
incomes of the poorest 20% of a country and food price—may aﬀect
child stunting at the national level and in rural and urban areas. Both
drivers may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence undernutrition. Climate change
may inﬂuence incomes via its impacts on crop production, health,
labor productivity, and disasters (Hallegatte and Rozenberg 2017).
In turn, low income and povertymanifest in a constellation of forms,
including lack of access towater and sanitation, essential medicines,
education, and adequate shelter and food; these forms combine to
increase the risk of undernutrition (Pogge 2010). Food prices have a
more complex relation to undernutrition: As well as directly inﬂu-
encing ability to purchase food, prices may inﬂuence incomes and
wages. For instance, sustained high prices may increase risks for
low-income net food consumers while reducing the risk for net food
producers (Hertel 2016; Ivanic andMartin 2008). Thus, interactions
between food price and incomes, and how they are each aﬀected by
climate change,may have unexpected aggregate eﬀects.
To investigate this, we used multilevel statistical modeling to
develop a global-level model that could be driven by projection
data provided by “poverty” and “food price” models. We then
projected moderate and severe stunting in children aged <5 at the
national level and in rural and urban areas in 2030 under low and
high climate change scenarios combined with poverty and pros-
perity socioeconomic scenarios.
Methods
In this section, we describe: a) the historical data and indicators
used when ﬁtting the stunting model, b) the forms of the equa-
tions and the process of ﬁtting the stunting model, and c) the pov-
erty and food-price models and the scenario-speciﬁc projection
data used to make the estimates of future stunting. For the latter,
a full set of projection data was available only out to 2030, and
this limited the temporal horizon of our stunting estimates.
Historical Data and Indicator Development
Stunting data for children <5 y of age were from the Global
Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition, which is based on
survey data using consistent growth standards to identify moder-
ate stunting (height-for-age Z-scores of −3 to −2) and severe
stunting (height-for-age Z-scores <− 3) (WHO 2017). Data for
individual countries during a given year were available for mod-
erate stunting and severe stunting, both at the national level and
separately for rural and urban areas in each country. Individual
countries were included in our analysis if they met three criteria.
First, data were available on the prevalence of moderate and severe
stunting from surveys performed on at least three occasions from
1990 onward. Second, they had suﬃcient data to derive estimates
of food prices at the national level and of incomes of the poorest
20% of the population in rural and urban areas, respectively, for the
majority of the years with stunting data. Third, these estimates of
food price and incomes of the poorest populations could also be
calculated for future years using output from poverty and food
pricemodels (described below.)
To develop an indicator of rural and urban incomes for each
country, we obtained historical data on the average GDPpc of the
population in the lowest 20% of the income distribution in each
country (GDPpc20), in Purchasing Power Parity 2005 dollars
(PPP$2005) (World Bank 2017) for each year with stunting data
(matched as closely as possible, within a maximum of 5 y). Next,
we used the ratio of rural to urban income or consumption to
derive area-level income indicators for the rural and urban popu-
lations in the lowest 20% of the income distribution (inc20Rij and
inc20Uij , respectively) for each country j on occasion i when stunt-
ing was measured:
inc20 Rð Þij =GDPpc20ij ×
income Rð Þij
income Rð Þij + income
Uð Þ
ij
0
@
1
A and
inc20 Uð Þij =GDPpc20ij ×
income Uð Þij
income Rð Þij + income
Uð Þ
ij
0
@
1
A (1)
where GDPpc20ij is the national-level average GDPpc of the low-
est 20% of the population of country j on occasion i (in PPP$
2005) [“i” is a sequential index of measurement occasion; this is
used because it corresponds to indexing commonly used in longi-
tudinal multilevel models (see below)], and incomeðRÞij and
incomeðUÞij represent the average values for income or consump-
tion in rural and urban areas of country j during year i. This met-
ric can be derived using data on either income or consumption, as
long as the same units are used for rural and urban areas in each
country and year. The indicator does not give an estimate of
actual income; rather, it provides a measure of the size of rural
and urban incomes that is comparable over time and across
countries. An increase in the income indicator for a given rural
or urban area indicates an increase in the average income of the
population in the lowest 20% of the income distribution for the
area.
There are two key assumptions in this indicator. First, projec-
tion data from the poverty model are for agricultural and nonagri-
cultural incomes. We assumed these corresponded to rural and
urban areas, respectively, because stunting data and historical
income data were split rural–urban. Second, historical data for ru-
ral and urban incomes of the bottom 20% were not available; we
thus assume that average incomes are roughly proportional to
incomes of the bottom 20%.
In addition, we derived the ratio of the rural-to-urban income
indicator for country j on occasion i as:
Dij =
inc20 Rð Þij
inc20 Uð Þij
(2)
We next developed an indicator of the aﬀordability of food
for the poorest 20% of the population in a given country. The
model used to project future food prices (described below) esti-
mated within-country changes in average national-level food pri-
ces relative to the year 2000 with the eﬀects of inﬂation removed,
such that the projected value is set to 1 for the year 2000 in all
countries, and a 10% increase in price in a given country and year
would result in an indicator= 1:1. We produced equivalent his-
torical price data by dividing the national-level Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for food (fCPI ij) by the general CPI (gCPI ij) (both
set to 100 for the year 2000) (ILO 2017) to get an indicator of
change in “real” food prices for country j on occasion i. Next, to
develop an indicator of food price relative to incomes of the pop-
ulation in lowest 20% of the income distribution that is compara-
ble across countries, we multiplied this by the domestic food
price index (DFPI, an indicator of average food price in a given
country relative to other countries) for county j in the year 2000
(FAO 2017b) and then divided it by GDPpc20ij=460, in which
“460” represents an annual income of $1:25 PPP2005, equal to
the World Bank poverty line (Chen and Ravallion 2008). The full
equation for the food price indicator (priceij) is:
Environmental Health Perspectives 097007-2 126(9) September 2018
priceij =
fCPIij
gCPIij
 
×DFPIj
GDPpc20ij
460
  (3)
Due to a lack of data, we could not derive separate indicators
for rural and urban areas; hence, priceij is a national-level indica-
tor of average prices across rural and urban areas in each country
on each occasion relative to incomes in the lowest 20% of the
income distribution. Additionally, a lack of data meant we were
unable to account for diﬀering expenditure patterns in low-
income populations; in eﬀect, it is assumed that expenditure pat-
terns are similar in this population group in the study countries.
As the food-price indicator increases, food becomes less aﬀord-
able (on average) for the poorest part of the population. If data
required to derive priceij for a speciﬁc year were missing, we
interpolated or extrapolated the existing series or used data from
the country’s nearest neighbor to derive a value.
Forms of the Model Equations and Model Fitting
As we had a mix of national-level and area-level predictors, we
used a two-stage approach, ﬁrst modeling national-level moderate
or severe stunting longitudinally, and then modeling area-level
(i.e., rural and urban) moderate or severe stunting as a function of
national-level stunting.We used random-eﬀects models to account
for unmeasured inﬂuences on stunting, and to allow us to make
general inferences for all countries at risk of stunting, rather than
limiting inferences only to the countries used to ﬁt themodel.
In the ﬁrst stage, we used “growth-curve” modeling (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012; Steele 2014) to estimate national-
level trajectories of moderate stunting and severe stunting, using
longitudinal national-level predictors while allowing for autocor-
relation, and to assess time-varying and ﬁxed predictors and
unexplained diﬀerences (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). We
used separate binomial logistic regression models (with the num-
ber stunted being calculated using prevalence and sample size
from the survey data for stunting) to derive estimates for the
prevalence of moderate stunting or severe stunting, respectively.
We initially ﬁt “null” growth-curve models that included ran-
dom eﬀects and year only. The approach provides a formal test
of whether a multilevel model gives a better ﬁt than an equivalent
single-level model and provides an initial assessment of stunting
trajectories in recent decades. Following this we ﬁt “full” models
containing the predictor variables for each outcome.
Separate ﬁrst-stage models for the log odds of moderate or severe
stunting vs. no stunting (respectively) at the national level for each
country j on occasion i for degree of stunting k (YðNÞijk ) (where the
superscriptN refers to national level) had the following form:
log
Y Nð Þijk
1− Y Nð Þijk
0
@
1
A= b Nð Þ0jk + b Nð Þ1jk tijð Þ+ b Nð Þ2k Gijð Þ+ b Nð Þ3k Pijð Þ
+ b Nð Þ4k Gij ×Pijð Þ+B  R (4)
bðNÞ0jk = b
ðNÞ
0k + u
ðNÞ
0jk (5)
bðNÞ1jk = b
ðNÞ
1k + u
ðNÞ
1jk (6)
where tij is the year of measurement of stunting, centered on the
year 2010; Gij is log(GDPpc20ij); Pij is mean centered log
(priceij); R is a column vector of 11 indicator variables for GBD
regions (as a contextual variable) (IHME 2015), and B is the cor-
responding row vector of ﬁxed parameters for each region. The
subscript k is degree of stunting (0 for moderate, and 1 for
severe). The coeﬃcients bðNÞ2k , b
ðNÞ
3k , and b
ðNÞ
4k are ﬁxed global pa-
rameters; bðNÞ0jk and b
ðNÞ
1jk are country-speciﬁc parameters. The ran-
dom eﬀects, representing unmeasured time-invariant country-
speciﬁc eﬀects, capture (given the covariates) country-level dif-
ferences, where uðNÞ0j is the random intercept, and u
ðNÞ
1j is the ran-
dom slope for year. The u terms are assumed to be normally
distributed with a mean of zero and collectively follow a multi-
variate normal distribution with a mean of zero and a speciﬁed
covariance (Steele 2014):
uðNÞ0jk
uðNÞ1jk
0
@
1
A∼Nð0,XuÞ where Xu = r2u0ru0u1 r2u1
 !
(7)
where r2u0k is the variance of u
ðNÞ
0jk , r
2
u1k is the variance of u
ðNÞ
1jk ,
and ru0u1 is the covariance of u
ðNÞ
0jk and u
ðNÞ
1jk .
In the second stage, we used multilevel binomial logistic
regression and area-level variables to estimate the log odds of
moderate stunting or severe stunting in rural areas and urban
areas, respectively (YðAÞijk ), where the superscript A refers to rural
or urban area, as a function of national-level stunting:
log
Y Að Þijk
1−Y Að Þijk
0
@
1
A= c Að Þ0jk + c Að Þ1jk Y Nð Þijk + c Að Þ2k I Að Þij 
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cðAÞ0jk = c
ðAÞ
0k +w
ðAÞ
0jk (9)
cðAÞ1jk = c
ðAÞ
1k +w
ðAÞ
1jk (10)
YðNÞijk is national-level stunting on occasion i in country j of
degree k (i.e., moderate or severe); IðAÞij represents area-level
income as log(inc20ðRÞij ) or log(inc20
ðUÞ
ij ) (from Equation 1) centered
just below its historical minimum; and Dij represents rural–urban
inequalities (from Equation 2). The coeﬃcients cðAÞ2k , c
ðAÞ
3k , c
ðAÞ
4k , and
cðAÞ5k areﬁxed area-level global parameters; c
ðAÞ
0jk and c
ðAÞ
1jk are country-
speciﬁc area-level parameters. The random eﬀects wðAÞ0jk and w
ðAÞ
1jk
capture unmeasured time-invariant country-speciﬁc area eﬀects
(country-speciﬁc random intercepts and random slopes, respec-
tively) for national-level stunting, which are assumed to be normally
distributed (as in Equation 7).
Whenmaking projections of rural and urban stunting, to ensure
consistency with the national-level projections, we proportionally
rescaled the rural and urban estimates for moderate and severe
stunting so that they summed to the national-level estimates.
All equations were ﬁtted in Stata 13.0 (StataCorp LLC) using
the “meqrlogit” command, which ﬁts random-eﬀects models for
binomial responses using QR decomposition.
UpstreamModels and Scenario-specific Projection Data
Two streams of modeled scenario-speciﬁc projection data were
used to drive the stunting model. The ﬁrst, for incomes, was from a
“poverty model” (Hallegatte and Rozenberg 2017), which is a
microsimulation model based on household surveys from 92 coun-
tries, thus representing individual households from across the
income spectrum. The second, for food prices, was from the Global
Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM) (Havlík et al. 2014;
Havlík et al. 2015) (Figure 1). Both models were initially driven by
standard climate and socioeconomic scenarios. Climate data were
from ﬁveGeneral CirculationModels (GCMs) under two emissions
Environmental Health Perspectives 097007-3 126(9) September 2018
scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (Moss
et al. 2010)). RCP 2.6 represents a low emissions future and RCP8.5
represents a high emissions future. Socioeconomic data were from
two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al. 2017).
SSP4 represents a world of rapid population growth, low economic
growth, and high inequalities. SSP5 is scenario with low population
growth, high economic growth, and large environmental pressures.
For the poverty model, based on the above scenarios, a set of
tailored scenarios were developed to account for both socioeco-
nomic and climate uncertainties in 2030. Firstly, socioeconomic
futures were developed. A total of 300 subscenarios for each SSP
were generated to capture the various ways that the macrolevel
conditions speciﬁed in the SSPs may be reached by 2030. This
included diﬀerences in factors such as: a) structural change, as
share of labor force in each sector (i.e., agriculture, manufactur-
ing, services) by skill level (i.e., low, high) and participation
rates; b) productivity growth of skilled and unskilled labor and in
each sector; c) demographic change, and d) policies (e.g., pen-
sions and social transfers). The scenarios based on SSP4 repre-
sent “poverty” futures, with a global stability in the fraction of
people living in poverty. Those based on SSP5 represent “pros-
perity” futures, which are broadly consistent with the achieve-
ment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United
Nations 2018).
Following this, climate was introduced into the model: ﬁrst, as a
counterfactual future without climate change and then as low- and
high-impact climate change scenarios. Because the magnitude of
climate change in 2030 is only minimally aﬀected by future emis-
sions and climate policies, the diﬀerence between the low- and high-
impact scenarios is related to the magnitude of expected impacts,
rather than emissions. Impacts in a set of sectors were assessed
across all the initial climate scenarios. These sectors included: a)
food prices and food production (as impacts of food price on house-
holds’ available income, and changes in farmers’ incomes); b)
health and labor productivity (stunting, as lost income over a life-
time; malaria and diarrheal disease, as treatment costs and days of
work lost; c) labor productivity losses, as proportion of labor time
lost; and, d) disasters, as income losses due to exposure to cyclones,
storm surge, ﬂoods, and drought). The smallest impacts were taken
to represent “low climate change” and the highest to represent “high
climate change.”
Of note, when accounting for uncertainty on how high food pri-
ces translate into higher revenues and for the diﬀerence between
landowners and laborers, diﬀerent assumptions were made in the
poverty and prosperity scenarios: in the prosperity scenario, a 1%
increase in food price translates into a 1% increase in farmers’
income; in the poverty scenario, a larger fraction of the gain is cap-
tured by landowners at the expense of laborers, and a 1% increase
in food price translates into a 0.5% increase in farmers’ income.
Finally, the three climate-change scenarios (no change, low, and
high) were combined with the two sets of socioeconomic scenarios
to give six sets of climate-socioeconomic scenarios under which the
poverty model was run. The data outputs from the poverty model
used to drive the stuntingmodel were national-level averageGDPpc
of the lowest 20% of the population (GDPpc20ij) and average
incomes in rural and urban areas (incomeRij and income
U
ij , respec-
tively), as well as population (split into agricultural and nonagricul-
tural for all ages and children <15). (See the original paper for a full
description of the povertymodel (Hallegatte andRozenberg 2017)).
For food prices, GLOBIOM accounted for (among other
things) future changes in crop productivity and global food trade,
and estimated relative changes in national-level food prices based
on results from Havlík et al. (2015). This provided data for the
national-level deﬂated food CPI (i.e., fCPI ij=gCPIij). Following
the method used for poverty model, we used the lowest prices in
2030 under SSP4 and SSP5 from any RCP-GCM combination for
“low climate change” in the “poverty” and “prosperity” scenarios,
respectively; similarly, we used the highest prices for “high climate
change.” Prices in futures without climate changewere used for the
“no climate change” scenarios.
Additionally, SSP-speciﬁc population projections for children
<5 y of age were taken from the Wittgenstein Centre for
Demography and Global Human Capital (2017). The poverty
model provided population data for children <15 y in agricul-
tural and nonagricultural families; we assumed that the
agricultural-to-nonagricultural ratio in children <5 y of age was
the same as that for children <15 y of age. Further we assumed
that agricultural populations lived in rural areas, and nonagri-
cultural families lived in urban areas.
In the stunting model, we combine the above projection data
to estimate patterns of undernutrition in children <5 y of age
given climate change–impacted incomes and food prices under
the climate and socioeconomic scenarios developed for the pov-
erty model.
Two issues arise in relation to the stunting model input data.
First, food-price estimates from GLOBIOM are one of the inputs
into the poverty model. That is, food prices inﬂuence incomes.
Second, in the poverty model, stunting aﬀects incomes. However,
as stunting-related income losses are seen in adults who were
stunted when children—i.e., 10 to 20 y previously—we assume
this is independent of stunted children <5 y of age in the time pe-
riod of interest (Figure 1). Combining these issues, we assume that
following the initial impacts of food prices and adult stunting on
income (along with impacts on income due to other factors), chil-
dren <5 y old are “exposed” to particular levels of income and
food prices relative to income, which together inﬂuence their risk
of stunting: this risk is quantiﬁed by the stuntingmodel.
Results
Historical Data Holdings
We began with a dataset for all countries with stunting data from
1990 onwards (WHO 2017). We then dropped observations
where stunting data were not split into moderate and severe (15
observations) and countries with measurements on less than three
occasions (39 countries). We then obtained income and price
data to match the stunting data.
Theﬁnal dataset was unbalanced (the number and years of obser-
vation diﬀered by country). It included 3–6 (mean= 4) observations
from 49 countries (Table 1) for a total of 194 country-year observa-
tions. Countries from 12 of the 21 GBD regions (IHME 2015) were
included (Table 1, Table S1). We did not include countries from
high-income regions (Asia Paciﬁc, High Income; Australasia;
Europe, Western; Latin America, Southern; North America, High
Income), where the prevalence of child stunting is very low, nor did
we include data from any countries in four of the low- and middle-
income GBD regions, speciﬁcally: Europe, Eastern; Latin America,
Tropical; Oceania; Sub-SaharanAfrica, Central.
For the national-level stunting data in the ﬁnal dataset, moder-
ate stunting ranged from 2.9% (The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia in 2011) to 32.8% (Nepal in 1998), with a mean of
18.6% and a median of 19.5%. Severe stunting ranged from 1.3%
(Jamaica in 1999) to 34.6% (India in 1993), with a mean of 14.6%
and a median of 13.4%. For the data underlying the income indica-
tor (Equation 1), 82 estimates were based on consumption (i.e.,
household spending) and 112 on income (i.e., household total
income). A total of 29% of observations were matched to the same
year as the stunting estimate, an additional 46% within 2 y, and the
remaining 25% within 5 y. For the data underlying the food price
indicator (Equation 2), 17% of values for the food CPI (fCPIij) and
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Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the relations among climate and socioeconomic projection data, upstream models, and the stunting model. Abbreviations: SSP,
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways; RCP, Representative Concentration Pathways; GCM, General Circulation Model; GLOBIOM, Global Biosphere Management
Model. In the “Upstreammodels” food price is one of the drivers of the impacts of climate change on income (shown by the link between GLOBIOM and the poverty
model), and, stunting is one of the drivers of income loss in the poverty model (due to income losses in adults who were stunted as children 10 to 20 y previously). It is
assumed that “agricultural” corresponds to rural populations and “nonagricultural” to urban populations and that the proportions of children <5 y of age in rural and
urban areaswere the sameas theestimated proportions of children<15 y of age in agricultural andnonagricultural families outputted from thepovertymodel.
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16% for general CPI (gCPIij) were interpolated or extrapolated,
and 5% of estimates for bothwere from nearest-neighbor countries.
Screening for outliers showed that the food CPI (which was set
equal to 100 in the year 2000) in Angola was 251 in the year 2001
and 2,618 in the year 2007. This apparent rapid rise to an extreme
level (the next-highest estimate in the dataset is 422) appears, if
assumed to be correct, to represent an outlier case in the dataset so
all observations were dropped. (Note that Angola is not included in
the summary data above.)
For full country-year level details of the data described above,
see Excel Table S1.
Model Fitting
We ﬁrst ﬁt national-level models (Equation 4) for moderate and
severe stunting, initially as null growth curve models (i.e., with
random eﬀects but no predictors other than year) and then as full
models (i.e., including all predictors) (Table 1). Null models for
both moderate and severe stunting had a good ﬁt and better
explained stunting trajectories than equivalent single-level mod-
els (i.e., the same models without random eﬀects) (Likelihood ra-
tio tests: p<0:0001). That is, as expected, there are substantial
between-country diﬀerences in stunting prevalence in the year
2010 as well as in trajectories of stunting over time. Using the
random parts of the null models, we estimated 95% coverage
intervals (the range over which 95% of country-speciﬁc values
would be expected to lie) for percent stunted in 2010 (based on
bðNÞ0jk ) and absolute change in percent stunted from 2000 to 2010
(based on bðNÞ1jk ). This involved conversion between log odds, odds
ratios, and predicted probabilities, and using the standard formula
for 95% coverage intervals (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012)
(See Appendix S1 for a full explanation of the calculations). For
Table 1. Estimated parameters for national-level models of moderate and severe stunting (odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for fixed parameters;
coefficients and standard errors for random variables).
Parametersa
Moderate Severe
Null model Full model Null model Full model
Fixed part
Year 0.986 0.99 0.962 0.97
(0.980, 0.992) (0.984, 0.996) (0.953, 0.972) (0.96, 0.98)
log(GDP per capita of the bottom 20%) 0.912 0.6
(0.851, 0.977) (0.553, 0.652)
log(food price indicator) 0.814 1.229
(0.727, 0.911) (1.072, 1.409)
Interaction of GDP and food price terms 1.03 0.928
(1.011, 1.05) (0.907, 0.949)
Constant 0.193 0.346 0.109 3.192
(0.164, 0.227) (0.215, 0.557) (0.086, 0.138) (1.729, 5.894)
Region:
Asia, Central 1 1
(reference) (reference)
Asia, East 0.531 0.308
(0.327, 0.862) (0.12, 0.795)
Asia, South 1.693 2.227
(1.341, 2.138) (1.318, 3.762)
Asia, South East 1.325 1.29
(1.065, 1.648) (0.796, 2.091)
Caribbean 0.357 0.183
(0.253, 0.505) (0.087, 0.385)
Europe, Central 0.501 0.512
(0.382, 0.659) (0.298, 0.88)
Latin America, Andean 1.33 0.752
(0.981, 1.804) (0.374, 1.509)
Latin America, Central 1.057 0.6
(0.856, 1.306) (0.371, 0.968)
North Africa and Middle East 0.785 0.592
(0.571, 1.079) (0.294, 1.192)
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern 1.569 1.605
(1.284, 1.916) (1.043, 2.47)
Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern 1.405 1.076
(1.075, 1.835) (0.598, 1.936)
Sub-Saharan Africa, West 1.093 1.147
(0.995, 1.201) (1.03, 1.278)
Random part
Variance in country-specific intercepts 0.332 0.046 0.702 0.2706
(0.0699) (0.0122) (.147) (0.0597)
Variance in country-specific slopes 0.0004 0.0004 .0012 0.0013
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Covariance of intercepts and slopes 0.00853 0.0016 0.01 0.0086
(0.0024) (0.001) (0.0048) (0.0034)
Note: Countries included are Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Columbia, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, TFYR of Macedonia, Turkey,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia.
aThe corresponding symbols used in Equations 4 to 6 are “Year”: bðNÞ1k , “log(GDP per capita of the bottom 20%)”: b
ðNÞ
2k , “log(food price indicator)”: b
ðNÞ
3k , “Interaction of GDP and food
price terms”: bðNÞ4k , “Constant”: b
ðNÞ
0k , “Region”: vector B, “Variance in country-specific intercepts”: var(b
ðNÞ
0jk ), “Variance in country-specific slopes”: var(b
ðNÞ
1jk ), “Covariance of inter-
cepts and slopes”: cov(bðNÞ0jk , b
ðNÞ
1jk ).
Environmental Health Perspectives 097007-6 126(9) September 2018
moderate stunting, predicted prevalence in 2010 across all countries
(as mean (ﬁfth centile, 95th centile)) was 16% (6% to 37%). For
severe stunting, prevalence in 2010 was predicted to be 10% (2% to
36%). The estimated absolute change in percent stunting over the
decade from 2000 to 2010 was −2:0% (−8:8% to 3.3%) for moder-
ate, and −4:0% (−14:1% to 2.3%) for severe stunting (positive
numbers indicate stunting increased). Additionally, the covariances
for the random intercept and slope [covariance(bðNÞ0jk , b
ðNÞ
1jk ); 0.00853
and 0.01 for moderate and severe stunting, respectively] indicate
that when the random intercept for stunting in the year 2010
increases, the slope for year also tends to increase (i.e., the rate of
decline of stunting decreases). This suggests that, in general, coun-
tries with more stunting in 2010 experienced slower rates of decline,
and this relationship is stronger for severe stunting than for moder-
ate stunting. (The correlation between the estimated random eﬀects
for slope (uðNÞ1jk ) and intercept (u
ðNÞ
0jk ) is 0.37 for moderate stunting
and 0.50 for severe stunting.) In line with this, between-
country variance in stunting [calculated as: varianceðbðNÞ0jk Þ+
2 ½covarianceðbðNÞ0jk , bðNÞ1jk Þ× tij+varianceðbðNÞ1jk Þ× t2ij (Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2012; Steele 2014)] has been increasing with time
(i.e., as all variance terms are positive, the value of the previous
equation becomes more positive as time increases); that is, although
stunting has generally been declining, some countries are being left
behind. If it is assumed that the countries included in the analysis
represent a random sample of all countries at risk of stunting, the
above ranges and patterns may be interpreted as reﬂecting those
seen globally.
Both full models for moderate and severe stunting had better
ﬁts than their counterpart null models (Likelihood ratio tests:
p<0:0001). After adding the main predictors to the model (i.e.,
Gij, Pij, Gij ×Pij), adding the contextual region variable had little
inﬂuence of the predictor coeﬃcients but the intercept random var-
iance [var(bðNÞ0jk )] decreased from 0.2716 to 0.046 (i.e., more than
quartered) and from 0.6856 to 0.2706 (i.e., more than halved) in
the moderate and severe stunting models, respectively. This sug-
gests unexplained between-country diﬀerences tend to cluster by
region, with stronger clustering formoderate than severe stunting.
We checked the model for multicollinearity of the main predic-
tors (the income and food-price indicators) as well as year and con-
cluded it was unlikely to inﬂuence model predictions. First, when
adding predictors to the models, there were no large increases in
standard errors, and these remained small (i.e., the 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals of the odds did not cross one) in the ﬁnal equa-
tions (Table 1) (Goldberger 1991). Second, to assess this more
formally, we used a two-step approach suggested by Hill and
Adkins (2003). In step one, Variance Inﬂations Factors (VIFs) are
used to check for the presence of multicollinearity. A commonly
used rule of thumb is that values greater than 10 suggest “serious”
multicollinearity. VIFs for the main predictors (excluding interac-
tion terms) were all less than 10 [1.1, 8.7, 8.9, for year, the log of
the food-price indicator (Pij), and the log of GDP20pc (Gij),
respectively]. As may be expected, however, the addition of the
interaction terms resulted in large VIFs (1.1, 61.7, 8.9, 54.6, for
year, the log of food-price indicator (Pij), the log of GDP20c (Gij),
and the price–income interaction (Pij ×Gij), respectively). In step
two, we derived signal-to-noise ratios (log(odds)/SE) for each pre-
dictor to assess whether multicollinearity is likely to bias model
coeﬃcients. If the ratios are judged to be suﬃciently high, multi-
collinearity is not likely to bias estimates (Hill and Adkins 2003).
For instance, a ratio >j1:96j would indicate that the 95% conﬁ-
dence interval would not cross the null (Kirkwood and Sterne
2003). Signal-to-noise ratios were within acceptable levels. For
instance, for moderate stunting, these were −2:6, −3:6, and 3.1 for
the log of GDP20pc (Gij), the log of the food-price indicator (Pij),
and their interaction, respectively (Table S2). Third, in situations
where multicollinearity is judged to be potentially harmful, parame-
ters for individual coeﬃcients may be biased (making it diﬃcult to
separate the eﬀects of individual predictors), whereas predictions
made by the model as a whole tend to remain reliable (Goldberger
1991; Hill and Adkins 2003). In our results, we do not attempt to
separate the eﬀects of income on stunting from those of price; in
fact, we argue they are inseparable. All our results are based on pre-
dictions made by the model as a whole. In sum, although multicolli-
nearity appears to be present due to the inclusion of the interaction
term, it is unlikely to aﬀect the predictionsmade by themodel.
To illustrate the change in stunting when income and food price
change together, we plot estimated percent stunted for average
countries (i.e., random eﬀects equal 0) in the reference region, with
year held constant at 2010, over a slightly larger range of GDP20pc
and the food-price indicator seen in the historical data (Figure 2).
Both moderate and severe stunting are at their predicted maxi-
mums (∼ 22% and 32%, respectively) when average income and
food price relative to income are at their lowest levels. This corre-
sponds to an average income level well below the $1:25 per day
poverty line. At this income, stunting declines as relative food pri-
ces rise. However, at this income, even at the highest relative prices
in the plots, moderate and severe stunting remain high (∼ 15% and
20% respectively). The lowest level of moderate stunting (∼ 12%)
is seen when incomes are highest (∼ 10 times the poverty line) and
relative prices are lowest. In contrast, the lowest level of severe
stunting (∼ 1%) is seen when incomes are highest but relative pri-
ces are highest; this is also when total stunting (moderate plus
severe) is at its lowest.
The vectors in the plots in Figure 2 give a hypothetical example
of the possible impacts of climate change on stunting if incomes
were to fall and prices were to rise. In the movement from A1 to
A2, as income falls and the price indicators rises,moderate stunting
increases from 15% to 18% and severe stunting increases from 13%
to 21%; total stunting rises by 11%. In contrast, at a higher income,
when going from B1 to B2, moderate stunting increases from 12%
to 14%, but severe stunting falls from 13% to 8%; total stunting
decreases by 4%. This shows there is an important interaction
between these two routes from climate to stunting.
Due to the limited availability of historical data we were unable
to validate the model using independent data. However, based on
the data used to ﬁt the models, the correlation between observed and
predicted stunting was high (r=0:98, for both models) and within-
countries trajectories appeared to be well reproduced. Model diag-
nostics also suggested themodelsﬁt well (Figures S1 and S2).
We next ﬁt the within-country models for distributing national-
level stunting between rural and urban areas (Table 2). We ﬁt mod-
els with the full set of predictors of interest, and then used back-
wards stepwise regression to remove nonsigniﬁcant predictors
(i.e., with 95% conﬁdence intervals that included the null). Again,
no independent data were available to validate the models, but cor-
relations between observed and predicted stunting were consis-
tently high (between 0.97 and 0.99) (Figure S3). Likelihood ratio
tests suggest the multilevel models have a better ﬁt than equivalent
single level models. However, model residuals for the random
eﬀects for all models (moderate and severe stunting, rural and
urban) show that the 95% conﬁdence intervals are wide and fre-
quently include zero. Further, residual plots for predicted stunting
show that the pattern of errors diﬀers by level of stunting and tend
to be greatest at lower prevalences (Figures S4 and S5). This sug-
gests that national-level stunting projections made using the equa-
tions, particularly when prevalence is low, should be interpreted
cautiously. We assessed the model for multicollinearity using the
same procedure we employed for Equation 5 and again found it
was not likely to aﬀect model predictions. (We note that standard
errors were wide for the inequalities predictor in the rural severe
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Figure 2. Plots for the full national-level (I) moderate and (II) severe stunting models showing the predicted prevalence of stunting as a function of log of the average
income of the bottom 20% of the income distribution and the log of the food-price indicator, in average countries (i.e., random eﬀects equal 0) in the reference region in
the year 2010.Note that the z-axis scale diﬀers for themoderate and severe stunting plots. Ranges of the average income and food-price indicator axes are slightly larger
than those in the historical data. Note that because the food-price indicator represents price relative to income, it is partly a function of income; that is, the x- and y-axes
are not independent. The vectors show examples of how the combined eﬀects of a fall in income and a rise in price relative to income (i.e., moving fromA1 to A2, and,
fromB1 toB2)can lead to either an increaseor decrease in stunting.See themodelﬁtting subsection of the results section fordetails.
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and urban moderate models; however, these were included in the
model as the standard errors for their interaction termswere small.)
(Table S3).
Estimates of Future Stunting
Projection data to drive the stunting model were available for 44 of
the 49 countries used to ﬁt the model. Figure 3 shows the aggre-
gated estimates of the number of children <5 y of age stunted in
the study countries in 2030 under the six scenarios (as means and
5th and 95th centiles across the 300 socioeconomic subscenarios).
The plot suggests, ﬁrst, within any socioeconomic scenario, the
impact of climate change in 2030 is relatively small (although not
negligible, as discussed ahead). This ﬁnding is consistent with pre-
vious work (e.g., Lloyd et al. 2014). Second, projected diﬀerences
between the two socioeconomic scenarios are large, with mean
estimates of 110 million stunted children in the poverty scenario
and 83 million in the prosperity scenario. Third, however, within-
socioeconomic scenario uncertainty in the magnitude of the esti-
mates is large: Estimates of total stunting range from 80 to 140mil-
lion in the poverty scenario, and from 57 to 108 million in the
prosperity scenario. That is, although there is generally less stunt-
ing in the prosperity scenario, allowing for uncertainties shows
there is signiﬁcant across-socioeconomic scenario overlap.
Table 3 shows aggregated climate change–attributable stunting
by scenario. These indicate, ﬁrst, in all scenarios, that there is more
stunting in 2030 in futures with climate change than without.
Across the scenarios, mean climate-change attributable stunting is
estimated to be between 570,000 (prosperity/low climate change)
and 1 million (poverty/high climate change). Second, in the pov-
erty scenarios, a large proportion of climate change–attributable
stunting is severe, whereas under the prosperity scenarios, the
moderate/severe balance tends to be more even. For example,
under poverty/high climate change, the mean estimate of the ratio
of moderate to severe climate change–attributable stunting is 0.39,
whereas under prosperity/high climate change it is 0.95. Third, in
both socioeconomic scenarios, as climate change increases, rural
areas bear a greater proportion of the burden than urban areas, but
less so in the prosperity than in the poverty scenarios. For the mean
estimates, the ratio of climate change–attributable number of peo-
ple stunted in rural versus urban areas rises from 1.06 to 1.22 under
poverty, and from 1.05 to 1.12 under prosperity. Fourth, within-
socioeconomic scenario uncertainty matters considerably more
under poverty/high climate change than in other scenarios, with a
diﬀerence of 550,000 stunted between the 5th and 95th centiles,
mostly due to diﬀerences in severe stunting. In general, this within-
socioeconomic scenario uncertainty in how macro conditions
speciﬁed by the SSPs are met matters more for severe than moder-
ate stunting in all scenarios.
Finally, aggregate results conceal underlying patterns in country-
level climate change–attributable stunting. We developed a typology
based on whether high climate change is expected to increase or
decrease the mean estimates of country-level total stunting relative to
low climate change in the poverty and prosperity scenarios (Table 4).
The typology is intended to indicate general tendencies in stunting
patterns in groups of countries sharing similar characteristics rather
than rigidly separate countries and expectations regarding stunting
based on statistical criteria. Type I includes 64% of countries (28 of
44) in which high climate change is expected to bring more stunting
than low climate change in both socioeconomic scenarios. In 36% of
countries, however, there was less climate change–attributable stunt-
ing under the high than under the low climate change scenario. In type
II countries (11), this occurred in both the poverty and prosperity sce-
narios; in type III countries (5), this was only in the poverty scenario;
and in type IV countries (2), thiswas only in the prosperity scenario.
Table 4 shows the patterns of incomes and food prices as coun-
triesmove from low to high climate change, by country type. In type
I countries, under low climate change, average incomes of the bot-
tom 20% are relatively low (2 to 2.5 times the poverty line) and the
food-price indicator (which indicates food prices relative to income)
is relatively high. Under both poverty and prosperity scenarios, high
climate change reduces incomes by a relative amount that is fairly
typical across all study countries (∼ 4%) but increases in the food-
price indicator are relatively high. The combination of low incomes
and large increases in price results in increased stunting as climate
change increases under both socioeconomic scenarios. In type II
countries under low climate change, incomes are relatively high
(4 to 5 times the poverty line), and the food-price indicator is
Table 2. Estimated parameters for the area-level models of moderate and severe stunting (odds ratios an 95% CI for fixed parameters; coefficients and standard
error for random variables).
Parametersa
Rural Urban
Moderate Severe Moderate Severe
Fixed part:
National-level stunting 1.026 1.069 1.071 1.044
(1.014, 1.039) (1.051, 1.087) (1.062, 1.08) (1.017, 1.073)
log(income indicator) 0.744 0.873 0.861 0.878
(0.682, 0.813) (0.786, 0.97) (0.776, 0.954) (0.77, 1.001)
Interaction of national-level stunting and income indicator terms 1.015 1.011 1.017
(1.011, 1.019) (1.007, 1.015) (1.01, 1.025)
Rural-urban inequalities 0.9 0.992 0.865
(0.845, 0.959) (0.845, 1.164) (0.68, 1.101)
Interaction of income indicator and inequalities terms 0.934 1.131
(0.861, 1.013) (1.007, 1.27)
Constant 0.179 0.09 0.066 0.041
(0.136, 0.237) (0.07, 0.116) (0.049, 0.089) (0.026, 0.066)
Random part:
Variance in intercepts 0.0803 0.152 0.2722 0.3936
(0.0295) (0.0389) (0.0843) (0.094)
Variance in slopes 0.0001 0.0015 0.0005 0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Covariance of intercepts and slopes −0:003 −0:0134 −0:0114 −0:0219
(0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0057)
aThe corresponding symbols used in Equation 8 to 10 are “National-level stunting”: cðAÞ1k , “log(income indicator)”: c
ðAÞ
2k . “Interaction of national-level stunting and income indicator
terms”: cðAÞ3k , “Rural-urban inequalities”: c
ðAÞ
4k , “Interaction of income indicator and inequalities terms”: c
ðAÞ
5k , “Constant”: c
ðAÞ
0k , “Variance in intercepts”: var(c
ðAÞ
0jk ), “Variance in slopes”:
var(cðAÞ1jk ), “Covariance of intercepts and slopes”: cov(c
ðAÞ
0jk , c
ðAÞ
1jk ).
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relatively low.High climate change brings typical (relative) drops in
incomes, but increases in the food-price indicator are relatively
small. This combination of higher average incomes and rising rela-
tive prices leads to decreases in stunting as climate change increases
under both socioeconomic scenarios.
In type III countries under low climate change, incomes
(3 times the poverty line) and relative prices are at an intermediate
level (Table 4). High climate change brings typical relative
decreases in income in both socioeconomic scenarios. In the
poverty scenario, the rise in relative price is relatively high, and—
at these intermediate incomes—the combination of income loss
and high price increases reduces overall stunting as climate change
increases. In the prosperity scenarios, the rise in relative price is
relatively small and does not appear to oﬀset the loss of income,
resulting in an increase in stunting as climate change increases.
Thus, type III countries appear to be at incomes where the overall
eﬀects of increases in relative food prices tend to be either harmful
or beneﬁcial.
Table 3. Estimated numbers of children (means, 5th and 95th percentiles) with climate change–attributable stunting in 2030 according to socioeconomic and
climate change scenarios in the 49 study countries.
Scenario
Stunting Severity Rural vs. Urban Areas
Total stuntedModerate Severe Moderate: Severea Rural Urban Rural: Urbanb
Poverty / high climate change
5th centile 269,800 489,100 0.55 409,700 349,200 1.17 758,900
Mean 288,400 736,500 0.39 563,300 461,700 1.22 1,025,000
95th centile 323,200 981,300 0.33 773,400 531,100 1.46 1,304,600
Poverty / low climate change
5th centile 181,600 432,100 0.42 328,900 284,700 1.16 613,600
Mean 199,200 569,300 0.35 396,100 372,400 1.06 768,500
95th centile 225,000 650,000 0.35 468,400 406,600 1.15 875,000
Prosperity / high climate change
5th centile 306,100 246,700 1.24 277,700 275,000 1.01 552,800
Mean 348,400 366,700 0.95 377,700 337,400 1.12 715,100
95th centile 385,900 493,500 0.78 490,600 388,800 1.26 879,500
Prosperity / low climate change
5th centile 207,000 256,100 0.81 232,100 231,000 1.00 463,100
Mean 222,300 347,600 0.64 291,800 278,100 1.05 569,900
95th centile 231,400 395,800 0.58 330,200 297,100 1.11 627,200
Note: Estimated numbers of children with climate change–attributable stunting are calculated for each combined scenarios as the number with stunting under high or low climate
change vs. no climate change with the socioeconomic scenario (poverty or prosperity) held constant. Study countries are listed below Table 1. Values for the 5th and 95th percentiles
represent distributions over the 300 subscenarios for each socioeconomic scenario (i.e., poverty or prosperity).
aRatio of the projected numbers of children with moderate vs. severe stunting due to climate change.
bRatio of the projected numbers of children with stunting due to climate change (regardless of severity) in rural vs. urban areas.
Figure 3. Projected numbers of stunted children (age <5 years) in the 49 study countries in 2030 under combined socioeconomic (poverty or prosperity) and
climate change scenarios (high climate change or low climate change), according to the degree of stunting (moderate or severe) and rural or urban area. Values
shown for each socioeconomic/climate change combination represent the distribution of estimates for 300 subscenarios for poverty and property projections,
respectively. Abbreviations: p5, 5th percentile; m, mean; p95, 95th percentile; pov, poverty scenario; prosp, prosperity scenario; CC, climate change.
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There are just two type IV countries, so interpretation should
be cautious (Table 4). Under low climate change, these countries
have the lowest average income (1.5 to 2 times the poverty line)
and high relative prices. In the poverty scenario, as climate
change increases, both the average decrease in incomes and
increase in relative prices are at their highest. Together, these fac-
tors increase stunting. In the prosperity scenario, climate change
brings typical reductions in incomes and a much lower increase
in price; in this case, stunting is reduced.
In sum, this research suggests that when average incomes of
the poorest are low and food prices are relatively high, losses of
income and further increases in price tend to increase stunting at
the national level. When incomes are higher and prices relative to
income are relatively low (note: this does not suggest absolute
food prices are low), losses of income may be oﬀset by price
increases, and overall stunting tends to decrease. This is presum-
ably due to gains made by low-income food producers and per-
haps by nonskilled wage earners. At intermediate incomes (i.e.,
around 3 times the poverty line) and relative prices, the overall
impact of higher relative prices tends to change from increasing
stunting to decreasing stunting as incomes of poorest rise further.
Discussion
To our knowledge, we have developed the ﬁrst global-level
model for estimating future climate change–attributable stunting
in which climate change acts through two interacting socioeco-
nomic drivers: incomes of the bottom 20% of a population and
food price relative to incomes. Previous global-level undernutri-
tion models have focused on changed food production and calorie
availability in ﬁxed socioeconomic conditions (e.g., Lloyd et al.
2011; Nelson et al. 2010). Such models provide insights into a
key inﬂuence on future undernutrition while placing other inﬂu-
ences in the background. Previous work has also suggested that
socioeconomic conditions play a major role in shaping future
undernutrition (e.g., Lloyd et al. 2014; Schmidhuber and Tubiello
2007): our model attempts to oﬀer new insights by focusing on
two of these conditions while placing other inﬂuences in the
background. Incomes of the poorest groups and food prices are
likely to play a central role in shaping future undernutrition
(Mazoyer and Roudart 2006; Pogge 2010). In rural areas, small-
holder farms (i.e., farms <2 hectares) are “home to about two bil-
lion people, including half the world’s undernourished people
and the majority of people living in absolute poverty” (IFAD
2011). The urban poor are also at high risk of undernutrition and
to the impacts of price and ﬁnancial shocks (Ruel et al. 2010).
Our null model suggests that the historical rate of decline in
stunting has generally been slow, even during the period in which
hunger was a focus of the Millennium Development Goals
(United Nations 2017). The average absolute annual decline over
the period 2000 to 2010 was estimated to be 0.2% for moderate
stunting and 0.4% for severe stunting, although larger declines
were seen in some countries (5th centiles of 0.88% for moderate
and 1.41% for severe). This estimate is similar to previous esti-
mates (Rieﬀ 2016). Additionally, between-country diﬀerences
widened as the biggest improvements tended to be in countries
Table 4. Projected average income of the bottom 20%, deflated food-price index, and food-price indicator for countries grouped by the pattern of the estimated
impact of high vs. low climate change on stunting under socioeconomic scenarios of poverty and prosperity.
Country
type
Low climate change High climate change
Relative difference between high
vs. low climate change
GDP20pc
mean (range)
Deflated fCPI
mean (range)
log(Food price
indicator) mean
(range)
GDP20pc
mean (range)
Deflated fCPI
mean (range)
log(Food price
indicator) mean
(range) GDP20pc
Deflated
fCPI
log(Food
price
indicator)
Type Ia
Poverty 869
(161 to 2157)
116
(91 to 171)
0.2
(−1:86 to 2.25)
832
(149 to 2094)
122
(94 to 182)
0.3
(−1:82 to 2.36)
−4% 5% 50%
Prosperity 1142
(255 to 2867)
105
(90 to 137)
−0:24
(−1:95 to 1.69)
1101
(243 to 2799)
108
(95 to 139)
−0:17
(−1:91 to 1.64)
−4% 3% 29%
Type IIb
Poverty 1839
(244 to 4957)
111
(96 to 129)
−0:42
(−2:18 to 1.41)
1764
(226 to 4792)
119
(98 to 149)
−0:31
(−2:12 to 1.67)
−4% 7% 26%
Prosperity 2174
(481 to 5327)
104
(96 to 117)
−0:79
(−2:24 to 0.64)
2082
(459 to 5065)
110
(99 to 125)
−0:69
(−2:17 to 0.67)
−4% 6% 13%
Type IIIc
Poverty 1262
(380 to 1938)
102
(88 to 120)
−0:37
(−1:92 to 1.06)
1211
(364 to 1867)
110
(93 to 135)
−0:25
(−1:83 to 1.22)
−4% 8% 32%
Prosperity 1603
(697 to 2207)
97
(90 to 106)
−0:76
(−2:07 to 0.38)
1531
(676 to 2101)
102
(94 to 113)
−0:68
(−2:00 to 0.44)
−4% 5% 11%
Type IVd
Poverty 703
(601 to 805)
123
(118 to 128)
0.09
(−0:58 to 0.75)
649
(556 to 742)
134
(131 to 138)
0.25
(−0:42 to 0.93)
−8% 9% 178%
Prosperity 1045
(916 to 1174)
108
(107 to 109)
−0:43
(−1:12 to 0.26)
999
(878 to 1119)
115
(113 to 117)
−0:32
(−1:01 to 0.27)
−4% 6% 26%
Note: GDPpc20: per capita Gross Domestic Product of the bottom 20% in PPP 2005 (∼ $460 is on the World Bank poverty line of $1:25 per day); Deflated fCPI =
national food consumer price index=national general consumer price index, an indication of the difference in within-country average food prices for 2030 relative to the year 2000 (i.e.,
it equals 1 in the year 2000; a value of 1.1, for example, indicates a 10% rise in price); log(Food price indicator): mean-centered natural log of the food price indicator (priceij)
(Equation 3), higher values indicate that food is less affordable for the poorest part of the population.
aType I countries: Stunting increases more with high climate change than low climate change under both poverty and prosperity scenarios (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru,
Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia).
bType II countries: Stunting increases more with low climate change than high climate change under both poverty and prosperity scenarios (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina
Faso, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Niger, TFYR of Macedonia).
cType III countries: Stunting increases more with low climate change than high climate change under poverty scenarios, but not under prosperity scenarios (China, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal,
Senegal, Tajikistan).
dType IV countries: Stunting increases more with low climate change than high climate change under prosperity scenarios, but not under poverty scenarios (Mauritania, Namibia).
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with lower levels of stunting. This widening suggests child stunt-
ing is likely to remain a major contributor to the global burden of
disease in the coming decades, even without the additional threats
posed by climate change. In the full model, when incomes and
relative food price were added, we found that their interaction
was critical: In some instances, a decline in income and increase
in relative prices increased stunting, whereas in others they
reduced it (Figure 2).
Adding regions to the model led to large reductions in unex-
plained between-country diﬀerences, with a much larger reduc-
tion in the moderate than in the severe stunting model. This
addition suggests that, although moderate and severe stunting are
distinguished using a quantitative scale, there may be qualitative
diﬀerences in their causes: Moderate stunting may tend to be
inﬂuenced more by regional structural factors operating both
within and between countries, whereas severe stunting may tend
to be more inﬂuenced by within-country processes (for example,
civil conﬂict). Given that severe stunting brings considerably
worse morbidity and mortality risks than moderate stunting does
(Black et al. 2008; Victora et al. 2008), further investigation of
this aspect in future work may provide useful insights.
Consistent with previous work (Lloyd et al. 2014), our projec-
tions suggest that climate change will have a relatively small—but
not insigniﬁcant—impact on stunting in 2030, whereas estimated
between-socioeconomic scenario diﬀerences are large. Mean esti-
mates of child stunting in the study countries in the poverty and
prosperity scenarios are 110 million and 83 million, respectively
(Figure 3). Of note, the wide variation in these estimates across the
300 subscenarios for each SSP (which diﬀered by demographic
characteristics, economic policies, the distribution and participa-
tion of labor, productivity growth by sector, and labor skill levels),
suggests that the particular mechanisms that produce poverty or
prosperity futures could have substantial inﬂuences on patterns of
health.
Our projections suggest that, in aggregate, stunting will increase
as climate change increases, with larger impacts under the poverty
scenario: We estimate that >1million additional children would be
stunted under poverty/high climate change, in comparison with
570,00 under prosperity/low climate change (Table 3). Further, our
estimates suggests that severe stunting would account for a greater
proportion of climate change–attributable stunting under the pov-
erty scenarios than in the prosperity scenarios, and that the potential
impact of climate change on stunting would be greater in rural areas
in comparisonwith urban areas under both socioeconomic scenarios
(Table 3). Previous analyses have suggested that the impact of rising
food prices on poverty is, in general, greater in urban areas than in
rural areas (Hertel et al. 2010; Ivanic and Martin 2008). These
results, however, are not directly comparable to our ﬁndings. First,
the causal pathways and outcome diﬀer: Our model looks at the
combined impacts of changes in food prices and incomes of the
poorest populations on child stunting, rather than how food prices
may aﬀect the number of people below a ﬁxed poverty line. Second,
the poverty model driving the stunting model assesses how climate
change may aﬀect incomes via multiple routes rather than through
food prices alone (Figure 1). Third, our estimates are based on
scenario-speciﬁc projections of future socioeconomic conditions,
whereas Hertel et al. (2010) hold future socioeconomic conditions
constant at present level and Ivanic and Martin (2008) analyze his-
torical data. Although this diﬀerent approachmay explain the diﬀer-
ences in the results, below we brieﬂy discuss further diﬀerences in
the modeling approaches and how the stunting model may be
improved by drawing on this food price–poverty literature.
We developed a typology based on country-level changes in
stunting in response to increasing climate change (Table 4). In
type I countries, incomes of the poorest are relatively low and
relative prices tend to be high; in this situation, our projections
suggest that increasing climate change is likely to increase stunt-
ing. In type II countries, incomes are higher and relative prices
are lower; there, increasing climate change is likely to decrease
stunting. Type III countries have intermediate incomes and rela-
tive food prices, and in these cases, increasing climate change
might increase or decrease stunting. That is, type III countries
appear to be at income levels where they may transition to type I
countries if incomes of the poorest fall, or to type II countries if
incomes of the poorest rise.
These patterns suggest that the impact of climate change will
be an increase in aggregate country-level stunting for countries in
which average incomes of the poorest are low and food is generally
less aﬀordable, even though rising food prices may beneﬁt some
population subgroups. However, when incomes of the poorest are
higher, sustained higher food prices (relative to incomes) tend to
lower country-level stunting (although some groups may be
harmed). This suggests that it is not continually falling food prices
that will eliminate undernutrition (see also: Hertel 2016); rather,
food prices that provide a decent income to farmers alongside high
levels of employment with wages that adequately cover the costs
of living is required (among other things) (Holt-Giménez and Patel
2009; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006; Weis 2007). In sum, the reduc-
tion and then elimination of poverty and inequality are required. If
these conditions were generally met, our estimates suggest that—
at least out to the 2030s—the potential harms of climate change on
stunting via the pathways considered would be signiﬁcantly
reduced. We stress that this does not suggest that climate change
may improve population health if incomes increase. Rather, it sug-
gests that higher incomes combined with “fair” food prices may
reduce stunting and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
Our model has a number of limitations. The ﬁrst relates to data
availability. For the historical stunting data, we found 49 countries
with at least three observations covering rural and urban areas and
split as moderate and severe since 1990 (WHO 2017) (Table S1).
We used random-eﬀects modeling which, by assuming these coun-
tries represent a random sample of all countries at risk of stunting,
allows us to make general statements about all aﬀected countries.
However, although the data coveredmany countries at greatest risk
of stunting (including 18 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 9 in South and
Southeast Asia), and countries with a wide range of stunting (2.9%
to 32.8% for moderate stunting; 1.3% to 34.6% for severe stunting),
we cannot rule out the potential for bias. Further, we included data
for China, a country whose size and particular patterns of develop-
ment can have a large inﬂuence on global-level trends of various
factors. For instance, an estimated one third of global farms are in
China (Lowder et al. 2016), and the inclusion or exclusion of China
from global trends in poverty reduction can reverse trajectories
(Pogge 2010). Given this, we assessed the potential inﬂuence of
China on our model by excluding it and found only very small
changes in the parameters for the main predictors. Despite these
limitations, model diagnostics for the national-level model show
the random eﬀects and residuals follow the expected distributions
(Figure S2), suggesting that general inferences may be both rea-
sonable and useful.
For the predictor variables, ﬁnding data that matched the avail-
able projections for incomes and prices, and that were comparable
across countries and over time, was diﬃcult. Consequently, it was
necessary to develop indicators using available data. However, as
the income indicator was split by area but the price indicator was at
the national level, we took a two stage-approach to modeling, ﬁrst
modeling the national level longitudinally and then modeling
stunting by area (i.e., rural and urban). Of note, we did not model
area as a distinct level as it not a random sample of area categories;
rather it is a dichotomous ﬁxed categorywithin a country.
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Second, we modeled moderate and severe stunting using inde-
pendent equations. This separation is unable to capture the dynam-
ics of changes in nutritional status and within-country migration.
For example, a severely stunted child in a rural area may leave this
category by becoming moderately stunted or well nourished, or by
dying; additionally, the child’s family may migrate to an urban
area, thus reducing rural stunting but increasing urban stunting.
Given the available data, it was not possible to include these dy-
namics in ourmodel.
Third, again due to limited data availability, we were not able
to formally validate themodel. The national-level equations appear
to have a reasonably good ﬁt and show strong correlations between
observed and predicted stunting; however, the diagnostics for the
area-level models show the ﬁt is not as good (Figures S3 and S4).
This was further evident when rescaling rural and urban moderate
and severe stunting projections so they summed to the national-
level projections. For the poverty/high climate change scenarios,
for example, the ratio of estimated rural and urban moderate stunt-
ing to estimated national-level stunting had a median of 1.02,
meaning the magnitude of rescaling was small. The 95th centile
was 1.15, requiring modest rescaling. However, the 5th centile was
0.63, which necessitated signiﬁcant rescaling. For severe stunting,
the ratio had a median of 0.95, 5th centile of 0.28, and 95th centile
of 1.35. That is, signiﬁcant rescaling was often required. Thus, the
projected patterns of rural and urban stunting should be interpreted
with some caution. This does not, however, aﬀect the national-
level projections, which are the basis of our core ﬁndings.
Fourth, due to the limits of the projection data, our stunting
estimates do not go beyond 2030. Further into the future, it would
be expected that increasing climate change would have greater
impacts on poverty and food prices due to, for example, increased
crop productivity losses, labor losses, infectious diseases, and
disasters (Smith et al. 2014). Our ﬁndings suggest that moderate
price increases in the context of reasonable incomes may bring
aggregate reductions in stunting. However, increased climate
change beyond 2030 may drive incomes of the poorest to low
levels and food prices steeply upwards, in turn bringing increased
child stunting. This possibility suggests the importance of near-
term changes that increase incomes and protect the livelihoods of
the poorest (in both rural and urban areas), alongside actions to
improve the resilience of food crops to climate change.
A related issue is that our model assumes that an adequate food
supply is available. This is arguably reasonable for the 2030s as esti-
mates suggest there is currently suﬃcient food to adequately feed
about 1.5 times the current population (Moore Lappé 2013), mean-
ing we have historically moved from “hunger amidst scarcity” to
“hunger amidst abundance” (Araghi 2000). However, further into
the future, increasing climate change and growing populations may
make food production an increasingly important cause of stunting
(e.g., Lloyd et al. 2011; Nelson et al. 2010). If our model were to be
used to make projections beyond 2030, it may need to be modiﬁed
to include food availability (and perhaps food quality).
Fifth, our model is driven by income projections that consider
shifts between general labor sectors (Hallegatte and Rozenberg
2017), represented as agricultural and nonagricultural incomes
(taken to represent rural and urban incomes, respectively) in our
model. However, previous studies looking at how food prices
aﬀect poverty have shown the importance of more detailed pat-
terns of income sources, as well as ratios of net buyers to net con-
sumers of food, in shaping the aggregate impacts of food prices
on poverty (Hertel et al. 2010; Hertel 2016; Ivanic and Martin
2008). These impacts of food prices on poverty would be
expected to inﬂuence patterns of undernutrition. Future under-
nutrition models could attempt to represent this explicitly, per-
haps by closer integration with the poverty model. However,
obtaining the required historical and projection data from a
large number of countries is likely to be diﬃcult. (For example,
Hertel et al. (2010) included 15 countries and Ivanic and
Martin (2008) included 9 countries.)
Sixth, despite the complexity of the causation of undernutri-
tion, we include explicit predictors related only to incomes and
food prices in our model. However, as our aim is to represent the
total eﬀects of incomes and food prices on stunting, we follow
the general logic outlined by Biggs et al. (2010). Although other
factors, such as education and access to water and sanitation,
aﬀect stunting, they are also likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by
incomes. This inﬂuence means that: a) if such factors were added
to a regression model, they would absorb some of the eﬀects of
income on stunting; and b) such factors are likely to be highly
collinear with income and may cause model ﬁtting problems.
Thus, by including just income and price, we attempt to capture
their full eﬀects regardless of the speciﬁc causal pathway from
the predictors to the outcomes.
Conclusions
Previous global-level models have shown that climate change–
attributable changes in food production and distribution may
aﬀect undernutrition and have highlighted the importance of soci-
oeconomic conditions. Our model shifts the focus to how climate
change may aﬀect two key socioeconomic drivers—incomes of
the poorest and food price—and assesses how their interaction
may inﬂuence stunting in the 2030s. The patterns in our aggre-
gate results suggest that stunting will increase as climate change
increases, with a greater proportion of the burden falling on rural
areas, and larger increases in severe stunting in comparison with
moderate stunting in the poverty scenarios.
The disaggregated country-level patterns oﬀer a diﬀerent
insight: In situations when incomes of the poorest are relatively
high, modest and sustained increases in food prices relative to
incomes may reduce overall stunting. This ﬁnding suggests, along
with ensuring that adequate quantities of food are produced in the
future, a key means of reducing the impacts of climate change on
stunting may be—rather than seeking ever-lower food prices—to
ensure food prices are high enough to sustain farming households
and that decent work with adequate incomes is available for all.
Views on how this, particularly the former, might be best achieved
are contested (e.g., FAO 2017a; McIntyre et al. 2009; Patel 2009),
but the results of our model suggest that agricultural futures that
protect health must consider not just availability, accessibility
(e.g., Hasegawa et al. 2016; Lloyd et al. 2011), and quality of food
(Myers et al. 2015), but also the incomes generated by those pro-
ducing the food. This aspect is perhaps particularly urgent as, coun-
terintuitively, food producers currently comprise around half of the
world’s undernourished people (IFAD2011).
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